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To Enforce, or Not To Enforce: A Study of Drug Use Vs Drug Dealing in Socially Disorganized Communities

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To enforce, or not to enforce: A study of drug use vs drug dealing in socially

disorganized communities

By

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To enforce, or not to enforce: A study of drug use vs drug dealing in socially

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Previous research suggests that competition in the low-skilled labor market associated with Latino immigration is related to crime for rural whites and urban blacks. Furthermore, studies suggest that communities can selectively enforce norms regarding crimes. This study tested whether low-skill job competition associated with Latino immigration is correlated with higher rates of drug use than drug dealing, and higher rates of instrumental crimes than expressive crimes. Furthermore, this study tested whether urban blacks were more affected than urban whites, and rural whites more than rural blacks. The results did not support the original hypotheses, except that urban blacks were more affected than urban whites. This suggests support for Anderson's *Code of the Street*. However, differing crime increases between rural and urban areas suggests that Anderson's theory may not work everywhere. Lastly, the control variables suggest that the race-crime relationship may be more complex when other factors are controlled for

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between immigration and crime is one that has been surrounded by controversy and inconsistencies in American history. From the massacre of indigenous people in early colonial days, to the Trump administration's moves against Muslim and Mexican immigrants, America has had difficult relations with immigrants from all parts of the world in its brief history. Though the cultural contributions made by many groups of immigrants have been invaluable for the diversity of America, attitudes and legislation surrounding immigration have made peaceful immigration reform an arduous task. One of the more consistent hindrances to peaceful immigration reform is the immigration-crime relationship. Particularly, the relationship between Latino immigration and crime comes under much scrutiny in contemporary political discourse. Though data show that there is no consistent link between immigration and crime in traditional destinations, preconceived notions about a causal relationship remain (O'Kane, 1992; Tanton & Lutton, 1993; Martinez & Lee, 1998; Reid et al, 2005).

One unintended effect of immigration restrictions in the 1990s was that low-skill Latino workers essentially became trapped in American borders, causing a growth in the number of Latinos in both rural and urban areas (Durand & Massey, 2006; Massey et al, 2003). Coupled with the increased number of Latino immigrants, deindustrialization

reduced the number of low-skill jobs available to Americans in numerous industries. Previous studies (e.g. Shihedah & Ousey, 1998; Shihedah & Barranco, 2010a; Shihedah & Barranco, 2010b) show that the loss of entry-level, low-skilled jobs in both rural and urban areas leads to higher rates of criminal offending for both blacks and whites.

For Latinos, moving to new immigration destinations tends to have an increase in the amount of criminal offending due to the socially disorganizing effects of being in an area with few social ties to an established Latino community (Durrand et al, 2000; Durrand, Massey, and Capoferro, 2005; Leach & Bean, 2008; Lichter et. al, 2010). In conjunction with the effects of the ceasing of circular work visas and the shrinking low-skill job availability, job competition becomes greater for whites and blacks in both rural and urban workforces. This, as previously noted, leads to higher rates of criminal offending. Many of the propositions set forth by social disorganization theory have been noted as having explanatory abilities for this phenomenon due to the relationship between unemployment, poverty, and crime (Kassarda & Janowitz, 1974; Messner & Tardif, 1986; Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994; Messner, 1988).

Previous studies have shown that even socially disorganized communities potentially have the ability to selectively enforce some norms more than others. When jobs are not as available due to competition, then certain parts of the community may not enforce norms pertaining to crimes like drug manufacturing and distribution as heavily since legitimate avenues for income are scarce. However, it is unlikely that crimes like drug possession would receive the same treatment, since these types of crimes do not bring money in to those who engage in the activity. Therefore, this study will examine whether, in communities where the low-skill job market has shifted in favor of Latinos,

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drug manufacturing and distribution crimes have increased significantly higher than drug possession crimes. Additionally, following the idea of crimes that bring in income occurring more frequently, this study will examine if instrumental crimes (robbery, theft, and motor vehicle theft) have increased significantly higher than expressive crimes (rape, murder, and assault) in these same areas. Furthermore, this study will examine whether this effect is different for metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

Social Disorganization Theory

Social Disorganization Theory is a criminological tradition that has existed since its sociological infancy in the early 1920s (Krohn et al.,2009). Though it did not come into the realm of criminology until the 1940s, its implications for crime began before then. Since its conception, social disorganization theory has gone through numerous alterations and extensions, many of these revolving around specifications of the clarification of the theory's concepts and central tenants, as well as attempts to empirically test the components of the theory. This theory has had a major impact on the study of criminological behavior, including a movement away from the biosocial approaches to studying crime where the focus of study was on the individual (Krohn et al.,2009). Rather than focusing on the individual, social disorganization theory focuses on *where* people live, and why this may influence them to commit crime/deviance. Though this theory fell out of popularity for a time, more recent revisions and testing has sparked renewed interest, and has consequently resulted a number of theorists attempting to adapt and extend social disorganization theory today. (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003).

Early inspiration for Social Disorganization Theory can be found in the work by Emile Durkheim. Durkheim believed that society, in order to maintain control over the

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activities of its people, needed to maintain a certain level of integration and solidarity (Durkheim, 1933). Without this control, Durkheim believed that people would abide by hedonistic principles and fall into crime. He also believed that a society's collective consciousness, social structures, and social solidarity must evolve alongside them in order to meet a society's needs (Durkheim, 1933). Collective consciousness affected people's perceptions of behaviors and what constitutes a crime, while social solidarity affected social control and the relationships between people. All of these functions of a society must adapt in response to changes in society for control to be effective (Durkheim, 1933). However, as societies became more and more complex, both collective consciousness and social solidarity weakened. This is especially true in a rapidly expanding modern society, thus creating further degrees of complexity. Though not labeled social disorganization at the time, early traces of this theory can be seen here.

Social Disorganization theory gained traction in the Chicago School during the early 1920s (Krohn et al.,2009). Early fixations on immigration were influential for the Chicago School in developing ideas about how social webs became disrupted. Early 20th century public policy focused heavily on how immigration from Eastern Europe (Rubin, 1941) and the migration of blacks from the South affected crime (Grossman, 1991). A large amount of these newly arriving people moved to low-income areas that already had issues with integration and crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942). The correlation gave rise to the idea of an "immigrant problem" in American society (Leuchtenberg, 1942). However, as paradigms shifted from the social Darwinist mindset to more ecological, social causation approaches, the places where people lived began to receive more attention than the people themselves.

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Some of the earlier notions of social (dis)organization can be found in the works of Park and Burgess. In their earlier works, the concept of social control was considered to be of great importance in understanding how different kinds of people can interact without calamity and disarray being the norm (Park and Burgess, 1924). Social control and social stability, therefore, were of utmost importance for communities.

Park and Burgess began this theoretical tradition by examining the effects of growing urbanization, industrialization, and immigration on the city of Chicago (Park and Burgess, 1925). They were particularly interested in the effects that these events had on social organization. Parks and Burgess had backgrounds in human ecology, so their focus was not on how this influenced crime, but people more generally (Park and Burgess, 1925). They concluded that the expansion of modern cities, and its effects, was akin to evolution in the animal world. This led to the development of their Concentric Zone Theory.

Concentric Zone theory proposed that cities can be divided into separate zones, where the most inner part (the Central Business District) housed most of the industries, factories, and offices, and the areas directly outside of this were the less desirable areas to live in (Park and Burgess, 1925). The more one ventured out from the CBD, the more residential the areas became. The expansion of the CBD led to deterioration of the areas in and directly adjacent to it. The Transition Zone, which was the area that surrounded the CBD, was a mix of residential areas and developing businesses (Park and Burgess, 1925). As the name suggests, the Transition Zone referred to the area where business and factories were beginning to develop. Though not fully destroyed, the residential areas in the Transition Zone were deteriorating. Park and Burgess predicted that this expansion

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led to social disorganization within these areas, where communities were noticeably less organized and intact. They noted how cities can be divided into sections of being more or less (dis)organization (Park and Burgess, 1925).

Park and Burgess's theory did not include crime as part of the equation. It was not until Shaw & McKay took the idea of social disorganization and applied it to theories of delinquency that this originated (Shaw & McKay, 1942). In the 1940s, Shaw and McKay examined how differences in social, economic, and cultural conditions paralleled varying rates of delinquency in certain communities (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Their concern focused on how economic, social, and cultural conditions correspond with crime and delinquency, and how this all is affected by population composition (Shaw & McKay, 1942). They were also concerned with how crime becomes considered normal in these communities, and what the implications of varying rates of delinquency in different communities were. After collecting official data on juvenile delinquency and conducting extensive fieldwork in Chicago, they determined that concentrations of delinquency were higher in commercial and industrial areas (Shaw & McKay, 1942). The characteristics of these areas included concentrations of poverty, residential mobility, and population heterogeneity (Shaw & McKay, 1942). These would become the three tenets of early social disorganization theory. These findings, as well as those from Park and Burgess, formed the early foundation of social disorganization theory. This offset the notions proposed by biosocial theories that stated individual attributes led to crime, and focused on what about the *places* where people lived affected rates of delinquency (Krohn et al, 2009).

The theory fell out of popularity during the 1960s for numerous reasons (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). The theory set forth by Shaw & McKay lacked clarity in how it operationalized and conceptualized some of the tenets of social disorganization (Bursik, 1988). Bursik pointed out a number of criticisms with the theory, with one of his most important criticisms being how early theorists did not clearly differentiate between the causes and effects of social disorganization. Increased crime and delinquency could be both a cause and effect of social disorganization, or part of social disorganization itself (Bursik, 1988). Additionally, criticisms surrounded how the theory had relied on official data, which bears many limitations, including how many communities are overrepresented in arrest data, and how there are many crimes that may not be reported (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Additionally, criticisms also involved the lack of testing of the actual tenets of social disorganization theory. The predictive ability of the theory had been displayed, but nothing beyond what Shaw & McKay showed (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Many theorists contributed to the revitalization of social disorganization theory. Due to their contributions, the theory has been both specified and expanded to attempt to gain more clarity.

Kornhauser (1978) attempted to reformulate and better elaborate on social disorganization theory as more of a control theory. She described early work by Thrasher as being viable for describing gang activity, but only moderately successful in correlating control and delinquency. She summarized Thrasher's study of gangs in Chicago as displaying how gang activity is a quest for order, but argued that it did not go far enough to link social control and delinquency (Kornhauser, 1978). Kornhauser stated that Shaw and McKay gave a more detailed analysis of the relationship between disorganization and

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weakened social control. She mentioned that the mixed model approach that Shaw and McKay took did lead to lack of clarity and precision in their control theory, however (Kornhauser, 1978). Therefore, she argued that using social disorganization as purely a control model would be more efficient.

She proposed that the central proponents of social disorganization (poverty, residential mobility, and population heterogeneity) resulted in weakened conventional values, as well as weakened social controls by the community (Kornhauser, 1978)). These weakened controls could lead to deviant subcultures, associations with delinquent peers, and persistent deviance in communities. Furthermore, she proposed that these weakened controls lead to disorganization of culture, as well as structural disorganization as described by Shaw and McKay (Kornhauser, 1978). This was all reminiscent of Kasarda's and Janowitz's concept of the systemic model of community, which was rooted in the idea that communities were a complex web of friendship and kindship networks (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). Korhnhauser found that economic status, which she proposed was best measured by economic independence, was the most significant predictor of higher neighborhood crime rates (Kornhauser, 1978). She also found ambiguous support for residential mobility and population heterogeneity. Her work pushed for a more focused approach to social disorganization, giving more attention to informal and formal networks and social controls.

An alternative approach to rapid expansion of cities and the effects of urbanity was Fischer's (1995) work on urbanization and its effect on city communities. He explained in his earlier works that larger, more populous places develop greater numbers of subcultures, which led to a more heterogenous population. These subcultures were also

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more distinct and intense. Fischer proposes that when these groups interact, they influence each other, which results in unconventional values for both the more prominent populations, as well as the less prominent ones (Fischer, 1995). Furthermore, Fischer stated that the larger populations have higher rates of unconventionality in relation to wider society. In his later works, Fischer addressed issues in the study of urbanism, such as the object of study, level of analysis, and mediating factors (Fischer, 1995). By reviewing literature relevant to the effects of urbanism, he found support for subculture heterogeneity, but discrepancies were found with the intensity of subcultures and the unconventionality of urban culture (Fischer, 1995). As with early disorganization theory, a lack of clarity in defining variables, as well as finding data to test them, limited the study. However, his argument remained that cities and rapidly expanding areas are not necessarily disorganized, but that they developed different subcultures and abided by different codes and rules. They were more complex with the combination of different subcultures, but this did not mean they were disorganized. Rather, that they were organizing differently.

These networks were then informed by both formal and informal associations that were tied into further socialization of youth and adolescents. In this view, community organization was treated as the main factor in community development and closeness in society (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). This led to a definition of social disorganization centered around the idea of communities being unable to realize the different values and goals of its residents, as well as being unable to maintain social control (Krohn et al., 2009). These weakened informal controls, as well as the inability for communities to

meet the needs of its residents (e.g. employment through low-skilled work) was a major focal point of the current study.

What constituted these informal networks and how they affected social control in these communities were still largely undefined until theorists such as Sampson and Bursik began to more clearly define how social disorganization could be measured in terms of how the community could regulate itself through informal and formal processes of social control (Krohn et. al, 2009). This furthered social disorganization by highlighting, as well as more clearly defining, the importance of informal social control networks. Bursik described how, when Shaw & McKay's social-disorganization model and Kasarda's and Janowitz's systemic model are combined and used in conjunction, a common theme emerged. This theme involved structural barriers interfering with certain communities' development of formal and informal ties that can hinder their development of the traits of a socially organized community (solidarity, cohesion, and integration) (Bursik, 1993). This alluded to the "ability" of communities to enact social control. When communities are disorganized, ties in the community break down and effectively diminish the ability of communities to control and enforce norms (Bursik, 1993). In addition, Bursik illustrated that the definition of what actually constituted a community is also of importance, as official measures of communities may not apply when residents describe what counts has "their" community. He showed how this subjectivity was important (Bursik, 1993).

Sampson, in multiple studies, examined how community characteristics affected crime and personal victimization. In his 1983 study, Sampson found that structural density of communities was positively related to rates of robbery and assault

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victimization, even when controlling for individual level characteristics (Sampson, 1983). Surprisingly, this effect was stronger for rural areas than urban areas (Sampson, 1983). Furthermore, in another study (Sampson, 1983), he also found that residential mobility, high numbers of female-headed households, and structural density were positively correlated with higher rates of personal victimization. These social integration and opportunity factors proved to predict victimization better than did individual level variables.

Sampson and Groves (1989) conducted a more direct test of the mediating factors of social disorganization theory, such as the ability of the community to supervise and control teenage peer groups, local friendship ties, and participation in formal and voluntary activities by the community. Additional factors examined by Sampson and Groves included marital issues at home, as well as urbanization. The results of this study supported assumptions of Shaw and McKay's theory, suggesting that varying amounts of disorganization between communities display an effect on both criminal victimization and offending. This study stood as the first direct test of the components and mediating components of social disorganization theory, rather than just testing its ability to predict deviance in certain communities (Sampson & Groves, 1989).

Stark furthered this notion of mediating variables by demonstrating how deviant area characteristics (poverty and residential mobility) and responses to these aspects of deviance by the community (moral cynicism) can amplify the deviance in an area (Stark, 1987). His 30 propositions showed how these informal and formal aspects are associated with deviance in socially disorganized areas. An additional study emphasizing the mediating effects of social disorganization was conducted by Morenoff and colleagues

(2001). He showed how social embeddedness, internal social characteristics, and social organizational processes were important for understanding community level variations in rates of violence. In particular, spatial proximity to violence, collective efficacy, and inequality (extreme concentrations on both sides) emerged as predictors of variations in homicide (Morenoff et. al, 2001).

As social disorganization research evolved, the factors of social capital and collective efficacy have been shown to have effects on social disorganization in communities. Some argued that the social ties described by Sampson, Morenoff, and Bursik are only useful for the potential they have for allowing access to resources, namely, social capital. Social capital is loosely defined as "intangible resources produced in 'relations among persons that facilitate action' for mutual benefit" (Coleman, 1998, p.309). The resources gained through social ties are argued to be more important than the ties themselves for establishing social control. These ties can include ties between neighboring parents facilitating the sharing of information or resources in the attempt to better monitor each other's children. Empirical studies have found support for a negative relationship between social capital produced through social ties and crime (Rose and Clear, 1998; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001).

Alone, these social ties and capital are not enough to explain residents' abilities to tackle issues in the community (Taylor, 2002). Though the web of connections and resources produced are necessary, they are not enough for purposive action to achieve social control. For an effective utilization of these factors to occur, a "willingness" to act must be present, which is only possible when the residents share mutual trust and unity (Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls, 1999). This is the basis of collective efficacy. Collective

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efficacy refers to a group's shared belief and ability to control the actions of both individuals and groups in a community (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Sampson's construct of collective efficacy was shown to have a negative effect on rates of violence in communities in Chicago, even after controlling for other individual-level characteristics (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Collective efficacy can still reduce crime, according to Sampson et al. (1997), even when social ties are low, further demonstrating the predictive abilities of collective efficacy.

More recently, the role of culture has come into the realm of consideration for social disorganization theory. Two particular types of cultural approaches are prevalent in the study of culture and disorganization (Warner, 2003). The first is the study of subcultures in disorganized communities. This approach looks at a "subculture" of delinquency (Warner, 2003). Shaw & McKay's three components (poverty, residential mobility, and population heterogeneity) are assumed to cause a conflicting subculture to normative and conventional values in these communities. Works by ethnographers like Elijah Anderson display the development of these subcultures in disorganized communities and how they incentivize and legitimize illegal and delinquent behaviors (Anderson, 1999). The second approach is culture attenuation, or weakening (Warner, 2003). It is not so much that a new type of conflicting subculture arises here, but rather that conventional values are too weak to serve as effective social control mechanisms in these communities. The strength of these conventional norms varies and is not strong enough to serve as a control (Warner, 2003). This idea of culture attenuation evolved from the words of Korhnhauser, Kasarda, and Sampson, but more clearly stresses the role of culture.

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The continuation of social disorganization theory has been supported multiple times by empirical evidence. This empirical support began anew with Sampson and Grove's (1989) study. This study found empirical support for Shaw & McKay's theory by testing the effects of local friendship ties, supervision of teenage groups, and low social participation. These variables were shown to be closely linked with Shaw & McKay's three key variables (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Furthermore, Morenoff's study of additional mediating factors of social disorganization demonstrated that social embeddedness, internal social characteristics, and social organizational processes were important for understanding community level variations in rates of violence (Morenoff et. al, 2001). In particular, as stated earlier, spatial proximity to violence, collective efficacy, and inequality emerged as predictors of variations in homicide. In regards to the cultural aspects, Warner also explored the role of attenuated culture in her study (Warner, 2003). Her results demonstrated that a majority of neighbors in the communities agreed with conventional values, though the communities still have high poverty and drug use. However, she also displayed that residents underestimated how much those surrounding them believed in the same values (Warner, 2003). These notions of shared beliefs also suggested that social ties are important because they provide a mechanism where shared values can be recognized. These studies have all been important in providing empirical support for the continued studying and improving of social disorganization theory.

More recent applications of Social Disorganization theory have demonstrated the flexibility of the theory, and how it can be used in conjunction with other theories to provide more nuanced explanations of crime in different settings. Ravalin and Tevis (2016) used a social disorganization paradigm to analyze crime on California community

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college campuses. Studying the relationship between social structure elements, organizational elements, and criminal activity, they found a positive relationship between personal and property crime, and the number of students receiving Pell Grants. Furthermore, the ability of social disorganization to be used in conjunction with other theories provides further evidence of the theory's utility.

The ability of Social Disorganization theory to be utilized with other theories and used in multiple settings has allowed it to inform potential policy considerations. A paper utilizing social disorganization propositions, alongside reintegrative shaming ideas, showed the potential of peacemaking criminology and restorative justice (Warner, Beck, and Ohmer, 2010). The policy implications that can be informed by Social Disorganization Theory's focus on informal social controls and collective efficacy can be important for moving crime control past the extremely punitive route it is currently on. Given the link made between crime, population turnover, and population heterogeneity, it is easy to see why Social Disorganization Theory and immigration have been so closely linked.

Immigration Reform

America's history is one woven with immigration and conflicts around immigration. From the conflicts with American indigenous people caused by the settling of the Puritans that founded the 13 colonies to current day battles over borders, issues concerning immigration have been a consistent topic of controversy. Prior to World War I, examples of American immigration reform can be seen in the Chinese Exclusion Act, as well as the Gentleman's Agreement with Japan (Guerin-Gonzales, 1994). Both of these acts restricted immigration from countries that supplied traditional migrant workers

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in both railroad and agriculture industries. Following World War I, the Immigration Acts of both 1921 and 1924 placed quota systems on the number of immigrants that could come in from certain countries. However, due to the fact that seaports were much easier to regulate than land-based entryways, Latino immigration was not nearly as regulated as immigrants from other counties without land-based access to the United States (Ngai,1999). This incentivized American labor markets to turn to these migrant workers to supply labor that was now missing due to the decrease of other labor-based immigrant groups. This marked one of the first major influxes of Latino immigrants in the United States, and led to substantial increase in the number of Latino workers in the country (Ngai, 1999).

World War II marked another important milestone for Latino migrant workers. As many of America's native-born workers were drafted to fight in the war, a large hole was left in the labor market that had to be filled. This created many opportunities for new immigrants to find employment. Even the government became involved in this, as the Bracero Accords of 1942 reveal (Craig, 1971). These accords brought Latino workers to America under government supervision, promising them wages, living quarters, and choice to return to Mexico once their work was done (Garcia, 2002). This program's success lasted beyond the war until 1964 (Calavita, 1992) and provided work to nearly 4.8 million Latino immigrants (Cerrutti and Massey, 2006). Once this program ended, many labor markets still continued to use these workers, whether or not they were documented. The continued use of migrant workers, coupled with the demand for unskilled labor that lasted until the 1970s and 1980s, fueled the number of undocumented immigrants in America that is still seen today.

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Policies surrounding Latino migrant workers have been characterized by discrepancies in regard to degrees of border control and attitudes, which has been associated with both increased numbers of Latinos in America, as well as diversity in regards to where they reside (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2003; Litcher, 2012). Prior to 1986, the trends of Latino immigration were largely a revolving door (Durand & Massey, 2006). Workers would come from Mexico to the United States (usually California and Texas), work, make money, and return to Mexico. However, border enforcing measures such as Operation Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper, in addition to legalizing programs like the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of the Reagan administration, drastically hindered legal avenues for migrant Latino workers to enter the United States, and deterred now legalized Latino workers from leaving for fear of being unable to return to America (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2003). Consequently, the number of Latino immigrants increased from 14.5 million in 1980 to 50.5 million in 2012 (Ramirez & De la Cruz, 2002; Lichter, 2012). As a result, Latinos now rank as the largest minority in the country (U.S. Census Bureau-PIO, 2010). This resulted in a major increase of low-skilled migrant workers in an already shrinking low-skilled labor market.

An additional consequence of these recent immigration reforms is the movement of Latino workers from traditional immigration destinations, mostly California and Texas, to newer areas in America (Durrand et. al, 2000). Many of these new immigration destinations were rural areas, a fact discussed in more detail below. Proposition 187 was an example of legislation enacted that incentivized racism and hostile attitudes towards Latinos (Calavita, 1996). This proposition resulted in a crackdown on illegal immigrants, companies hiring illegal immigrants, and people supplying forged official documents to

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them. Though many of this provision's tenets were not upheld in court, the message became clear that these workers were not welcomed, and caused an exodus of many Latino workers to new areas. This, plus the increase of opportunities in other parts of the country, lured these migrant workers to new destinations (Krissman, 2000; Kandel and Cromartie, 2004).

Latino migrant workers were met with similar opposition in these new destinations, however, and also began to experience new hardships. Flores (2015) illustrated how anti-immigrant narratives, coded language, and public polices kindled public anxiety over the newly arriving workers that mirrored those displayed in California. Laws allowing local enforcement of federal laws, discrimination against non-English speakers, and fines for employers hiring undocumented workers further established this narrative of an unwelcoming attitude towards Latino migrant workers (Flores, 2015).

In addition to natives associating Latino immigrants with social disorder, these new immigration destinations began to have effects on the migrant population. Migrant workers had established community structures to help foster ties and bonds in traditional immigration areas. This influenced what has been referred to as a "Latino Paradox" (Kochhar, 2008). The Latino Paradox is where Latinos, a disadvantaged, minority group, actually have lower crime rates than would be expected considering their position. However, these new destinations lacked those social structures found in their original destinations. The lack of those structures, in conjunction with a hostile native disposition towards these workers and lack of integration of this newly, rapidly expanding population, fostered social disorganization within the Latino migrant community (Leach

and Bean, 2008). The combination of these factors was associated with increased Latino victimization in these new destinations (Shihadeh and Barranco, 2013).

Though the stereotype that Latino immigrants are naturally criminal has persisted in society through the past century, there has been no consistent empirical evidence to support this notion. Some studies have found a positive correlation between Latino immigration and crime (e.g. O'Kane, 1992; Tanton and Lutton, 1993), but may others have suggested just the opposite (e.g. Butcher and Piehl, 1998; Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson, 2006), with higher Latino immigration associated with lower crimes rates. The idea that immigration increases crime has been mostly disavowed in academic work (Martinez and Lee, 1998), and some studies have gone as far as to say that Latino immigration actually decreases crime (Sampson, 2006). In fact, crime drastically decreased in the U.S. during the 1990s, which is the same time that Latino immigration increased so rapidly. Though this seemed contrary to early disorganization propositions, the complex web of social ties created by the immersion of newly arriving immigrants in traditional destination certainly abides by more nuanced principles set forth by social disorganization theorists. However, more recent research has suggested that an indirect relationship between Latino immigration and crime exists through the competition for low-skilled jobs in communities.

Low-Skill Job Competition

An additional consequence associated with the militarized border control, apart from the increased Latino population, is the increased competition in the low-skilled job market. This competition can be seen affecting labor markets in both rural and urban areas alike, though for slightly different reasons. Urban blacks and rural whites

particularly felt the effects of low-skilled job competition associated with immigration reform (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010a; Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010d). Despite the immense cultural contributions that Latino immigrants have made, ignoring the effect caused to the labor market by employers heavily recruiting low-skill Latino workers would be ignoring a significant factor in the shaping of both rural and urban employment patterns.

Urban Labor Market Changes

The Civil Rights movement was a defining moment for blacks in America. The legal and cultural changes brought by the Civil Rights movement provided numerous avenues for the lives and positions of many blacks to improve. However, the effects were not felt evenly across the black community. Both pre-WWII urban and rural job markets were characterized by a plentiful supply of low-skilled jobs (Kasarda, 1993). For urban areas, these jobs were primarily in construction and manufacturing. However, due to the loss of these jobs because of deindustrialization, these low-skill jobs became less available, further exacerbating the degree of poverty and disorganization in inner-city communities (Kasarda, 1993). The jobs that did remain began to move out of the inner-city to suburban areas. These jobs were then replaced by white collar jobs that the residents of these comminutes lacked the education and skills to attain. As a result, poverty and unemployment in urban areas continued to expand (Kasarda, 1993).

Disorganization in black, inner city communities was not only a result of a lack of jobs in the post-WWII deindustrializing era, but was also affected by racist attitudes and the mobility of successful blacks from these inner-city communities and the population turnover that it caused (Wilson, 1987). Mobility of successful blacks from these

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communities removed many essential role models for younger members of the communities, as well as more established community leaders who allowed for some degree of integration with the white community. This disrupted the social web that affected social control in the community, further increasing the degree of disorganization that fostered crime (Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996; Krivo & Petterson, 2000).

Furthermore, racist policies in employment, housing, and the criminal justice system contributed to these disorganized communities. Black populations in America already suffered due to a long-shared history of racial violence and prejudice. Though laws changed in the wake of the Civil Rights era, many policies and structures still remained that hindered equal opportunities for blacks. As seen in Alexander's (2010) *The New Jim Crow*, the War on Drugs, and its emphasis on "law and order", created an atmosphere that facilitated already existing racial barriers that made finding decent employment nearly impossible for impoverished African Americans. Mass incarceration, and the image of the "criminal blackman" became increasingly influential, and further isolated black communities (Young, 2006). These events created severely segregated, racially homogeneous communities, and, along with poverty and residential mobility, display the effects of social disorganization.

Rural Labor Market Changes

The effect of the loss of low-skill jobs, though not as well documented, was even worse for rural areas in America. Though urban and rural job markets are similar in many aspects, rural America is characterized by a heavy reliance on low-skilled jobs (Gibbs et al 2004). Additionally, compared to urban areas, rural job markets lost low-skilled jobs at a faster rate than did urban ones (Gibbs et al, 2005). Filteau (2015) found that labor

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market changes had effects that spread widely in rural communities. He found that as the labor market in rural areas changes, so do constructions of masculinity in the labor market. Jobs that were considered feminine during earlier economic periods were considered masculine when previous avenues became unavailable (Filteau, 2015).

Few studies have examined the relationship between rural economic conditions and crime, but those that have been conducted have found implications between economic conditions and criminal activity (e.g., Kposowa & Breault 1993; Kposowa et al. 1995; Lee et al. 2003; Lee and Stevenson 2006). Kposowa & Breault (1993) found that the results based on studies of urban areas were not generalizable to the all areas of the U.S. However, support was found for economic deprivation, subculture of violence perspectives, and social disorganization. Later, Kposowa et al. (1995) found that certain structural factors were able to predict different kinds of crime. Poverty, population density, and divorce were found to be predictors of higher rates of homicide in rural counties. Economic deprivation and urbanity predicted higher rates of property and violent crime (Kpsowa et al., 1995). Lee et al. (2003) conducted a study that showed socioeconomic disadvantage had a significant impact on homicide rates in rural areas. Lee & Stevenson (2006) found that gender-specific measures of poverty, unemployment, and female-headed households did not predict higher female crime, but that these same variables, when gender-specified for men, did predict higher rates of homicide by men (Lee et al., 2003).

This relationship was similar to that found in urban settings, though the implication remained larger for rural areas due to the heavier reliance on low-skilled jobs (42.2% of all jobs in 2000 for rural areas versus 34% in urban areas) (Gibbs et al, 2004).

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This reliance, like urban areas, has a heavy bearing on the structure of the community. The composition of the labor market does vary within rural communities, however. Though many rural areas lost jobs that focused on resource extraction and farming, others were able to survive off of tourism industries and the oil market (Brown & Swanson, 2003). Variances in rural communities are also visible in relation to their racial dynamics. Though long held conceptions of rural America being mostly white have persisted, the truth is variances exist between different areas of rural America (Lichter, 2012). Between Indian reservations and the "black belt" in the South, it becomes clear that the racial makeup of rural areas is not homogenous. Though some areas are whiter, the location of a community can have important implications for its racial dynamics (Lichter, 2012). This relationship becomes more complex when the relationship between Latino low-skilled workers and rural agricultural jobs is taken into account.

Latino Competition for Low-Skill Jobs

Tied to the issues of this dwindling supply of jobs requiring limited technical skills in rural and urban areas is the influx of low-skilled Latino workers who essentially became trapped in the U.S. due to the unintended effects of stricter immigration laws. After return to Mexico became too risky for many of these migrant workers, remaining in low-skilled work in the U.S. became the only avenue for many. Latinos successfully competed for low-skilled jobs for a number of reasons. The youthful age distribution of many of these immigrants made them prime candidates for the difficult physical labor of manufacturing and agriculture. Additionally, low educational attainment by most made keeping Latino workers' wages low a simpler process for employers (Aponte, 1996). Furthermore, a majority of Latino immigrants held a much lower reserve wage than their

black and white counterparts (Wilson, 1996). These factors increased their attractiveness to employers. These aspects are further complicated by potential legality statuses for many Latino low-skilled workers, which effectively eliminate a large amount of negotiating power for the workers. Latinos also had access to a racialized labor market, where many employers equated Latino ethnicity with a better work ethic and ability to perform the duties required more efficiently (Waldinger,1997; Johnson-Webb, 2002). For these reasons, and more, employers, especially rural employers, heavily recruited Latino workers (Kandel, 2006). When it came to "traditional" immigration destinations, Latinos could use their dense web of social connections to find employment (Fernandez-Kelley & Patricia, 1995; Aguilera and Massey, 2003). Utilizing these connections has been shown to work for Latinos seeking work from both immigrant and non-immigrant owned businesses.

The overall growth of the Latino population is related to issues for rural and urban America alike. The already existing structural inequalities that were in place for African Americans, coupled with the dwindling availability of low-skill jobs, made finding suitable employment arduous for urban blacks. However, when the task of competing with migrant Latino workers is added to the mix, this further exacerbated the structural issues pertaining to poverty and crime in these communities. Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a) found that Latino immigration was positively correlated with black violence in urban areas. The increase in violence was attributed to an increase in black unemployment caused by losing ground to Latinos in the low-skill job market. (Barranco, 2014).

In rural settings, low-skill job competition was just as important. Compared to the low-skill labor market in urban settings, which is primarily composed of black workers, rural low-skill workers are primarily non-black (Gibbs et al., 2004). Additionally, rural immigration growth outpaced the rate of immigration growth in urban areas. This was especially true for the South, Midwest, and Northeast (Saenz & Torres, 2003). In fact, 25% of all non-metropolitan growth from 1990-2000 was comprised of Latinos in these areas (Lichter & Johnson, 2006). Because the influx of Latino migration to rural areas was primarily job focused, increases in the Latino population occurred mostly in rural areas where low-skilled jobs in agriculture and meat packing were prevalent. The increased rural Latino population resulted in similar type of competition for non-black rural workers that it did for urban blacks. Competition was further increased due to the heavy recruitment being conducted by rural employers. Shihadeh and Barranco (2010d) found that, when low-skilled job markets shifted to Latinos in rural areas, violence increased for non-Latino whites. However, it did not increase for blacks in these areas. The increase of crime in these areas displayed the socially disorganizing effects of low-skill job competition. Previous research examining low-skill labor markets and crime have focused on how the disorganizing effects of unemployment have increased violence. However, I believe the relationship between disorganization, job loss, and crime is more complex and this relationship may vary depending on the types of crime, as suggested below.

Ability of Communities to Selectively Control

Though the effects of social disorganization in communities has been shown to be detrimental, the relationship between disorganization and crime may be more complex

than previously thought. When communities become socially disorganized, the citizens "become preoccupied with their difficulties, the residents…are simultaneously ineffective parents and apathetic citizens. The larger the concentration of distracted persons in a community, the less capable the community becomes for united resistance to anything – including crime." (Toby, 1957, p.13). However, prior literature suggests that even socially disorganized communities may be able, or willing, to enforce certain norms more than others. Furst et al (1999) found that a decrease in youth cocaine use in the New York was tied to the stigmatizing image of the "crack head" placed by both media and the community (Furst et. al, 1999). Similarly, Friedman et. al (2007) found that the stigmatizing influence of certain New York communities enacted a certain control over drug users to "keep it together", and either hide their drug use, or avoid using it entirely around the other residents of a community. Thus, even disorganized communities were able to increase the amount of social control it exerted over certain undesirable behaviors, suggesting that these communities may not be as disorganized as previously thought. This ability to selectively increase social controls suggests that perhaps a different type of organization has occurred.

In contrast, some communities may be more willing to allow certain undesirable behaviors if they benefit certain parts of the community. For instance, research on inner city crime has shown that perceptions of drug dealing in communities is not always negative because of the financial associations that are tied with them. In Anderson's (1999) Code of the Street, dealers often had the respect of some residents because of the perceived lack of legitimate opportunities available to make money. Alexander (2010) discusses similar notions in The New Jim Crow, where she argues that it is widely

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understood in disorganized communities that the lack of legal avenues for income as a result of mass incarceration leaves many with little choice but to turn to dealing. It becomes possible, then, that communities are more willing to enforce norms when it comes to expressive type crimes like drug using (as seen with the "crack head" stigma), but are more lenient when it comes to financially motivated, instrumental actions like drug dealing when legal avenues to making money are blocked.

The predictions of the current study are similar to those of Merton's Deviance Typology. Robert K. Merton, in his development of Social Strain Theory, argued that certain social structures and conditions may pressure citizens to engage in criminal activity (Merton, 1938). These strains can be structural or individual in nature, but the overall effect is people are pressured to perform or engage in criminal activity. Within this theory, Merton discusses a typology of deviance that delineates a relationship between the goals of society, a person's acceptance of those goals, society's prescribed means to attain those goals, and a person's belief in the legitimacy of those means (Merton, 1938). According to this paradigm, a person can fall into one of four categories (conformist, innovator, ritualist, retreatist, or rebel).

If a person accepts both society's goals and the means to attain them, they are a conformist (Merton, 1938). Alternatively, accepting only the goals, but not the means places them in the category of an innovator. When a person does not accept the goals, but goes along with the means, they are categorized as a ritualist (Merton, 1938). If a person accepts neither the goals nor the means, they are retreatists. The last category, like retreatism, describes someone who accepts neither the goals or means of society (Merton, 1938). However, unlike retreatism, rebellion includes replacing the goals and means of

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society with a person's own. This typology can be applied to this study because, according to the hypotheses, community members would be accepting of both conformist, ritualists, and innovators. Drug manufacturing and distribution would fall under the category of innovator, due to the fact that these people are still aspiring to make money (i.e. accepting society's goals), but not by society's prescribed means. However, according to the hypotheses, communities would not accept rebellion, such as murder or rape.

CHAPTER III

CURRENT STUDY

The current study investigates this idea by examining how the loss of low-skilled jobs affects drug distribution and manufacturing and drug possession in communities. Drug possession may or may not negatively impact a community, but few would argue that it is beneficial. Depending on the financial and labor market situations of certain communities, drug distribution and manufacturing could be seen as a way to make income when legitimate avenues are scarce – for both individuals and different segments of the community. Though drug distribution and manufacturing may not normally be tolerated in a community, if the disorganizing effects of job loss make legal avenues scarce, then communities may decrease their willingness to use informal controls in relation to financially motivated crimes like this one. However, because drug possession itself does not bring in income to the community, and cannot be viewed as beneficial to the community, it would not seem likely that communities, even socially disorganized ones, would not enforce norms related to stigmatizing and shaming drug possession. This notion can be furthered tested by comparing instrumental crimes and expressive crimes in general.

Expressive crimes are often argument-based and lack a financial motivation. Examples include rape, murder (not in the course of a robbery), and aggravated assault. Instrumental crimes, on the other hand, are defined as those crimes by which the primary motivation is to bring financial gain to the offender. Examples include robbery, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and many white-collar crimes. The prevalence of these types of crime may vary according to the cause of social disorganization in the community. If the cause of disorganization is economically based, as is the case with low-skilled job competition, then perhaps instrumental crimes would be more likely to occur. Lastly, due to the differences in rural and urban labor markets, as well as differences in crime rates, the effects of disorganization on rural and urban communities will be compared.

Hypotheses

Based on my review of the literature, I have developed the following expectations:

Hypothesis 1: Low-skill market shifts in Latinos' favor will have a larger, positive effect on drug distribution and manufacturing crimes than on drug possession.

Hypothesis 2: Low-skill market shifts in Latinos' favor will have a lager, positive effect on instrumental crimes than on expressive crimes.

Hypothesis 3: The effect of the loss of low-skill labor on crime will be positive and have a stronger, positive effect for rural whites than rural blacks. This idea is derived from the research done by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010d).

Hypothesis 4: The effect of the loss of low-skill labor on crime will be positive and have a stronger, positive effect for urban blacks than urban whites. This idea is derived from the research done by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a).

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<center>**Methods**</center>

In order to analyze the questions presented above, data will be used to measure aspects of social disorganization theory at the community level, competition for low-skill jobs between Latinos and non-Latinos, as well as instrumental and expressive type crimes. To conduct these analyses, I used data from counties in the U.S. with at least 1000 Latinos, 1000 blacks, and 1000 whites, and for which there was racially disaggregated arrest data available for 2009, 2010, 2011. These population cutoffs insure there are enough cases to calculate the racially disaggregated variables described below. This resulted in 886 counties for the study.

The dependent variables for this study will be drawn from the 2009, 2010, and 2011 Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data (UCR). The UCR categorizes arrests by factors such as age, sex and race and is summarized yearly for counties in the United States.

Dependent Variable

The first set of dependent variables will be race-specific arrest rates for sale/manufacturing of drugs in each county (*Black Drug Manufacturing and Distribution*, *White Drug Manufacturing and Distribution*). Each rate was a 3-year average from 2009-2011 and was race specific. The formula for each dependent variable was the sum number of arrests, either blacks or white, depending on the variable, from 2009, 2010, and 2011 in each county. This number was then divided by the county population in 2010 and multiplied by 100,000. The formula is the same for the rest of the dependent variables. The second variable will be race-specific arrest rates for possession of drugs in each county (*Black Drug Possession*, *White Drug Possession*). Furthermore, a variable

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will be created for race-specific arrests rates of instrumental crimes (robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft,) (*Black Instrumental Crimes*, *White Instrumental Crimes*) and race-specific expressive crimes (murder, assault, and rape) (*Black Expressive Crimes*, *White Expressive Crimes*). Due to the skewness of theses crime rates, all models were run using the logged rate of each dependent variable.

Independent Variables

The independent variables described below have been used in previous studies looking at the relationship between crime and low skill job competition associated with Latino immigration (Shihedah & Barranco, 2010a; Shihedah & Barranco, 2010b) and were obtained/calculated using the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates. The ACS is a survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and contains data pertaining to content such as ancestry, income, educational gains, immigration and migration, employment, and language proficiency. The purpose of these data is to determine funding distribution and track shifting demographics by public and private sector organizations.

The first key explanatory variable measures Latino immigration. This is the proportion of Latinos living in a county who were not born in the United States (*Latino Immigration*). This does not include undocumented immigrants. I found no defensible algorithm for making inter-county adjustments, so no adjustments were made to adjust for this. Furthermore, existing estimates of undocumented immigrants are rough at best, and are usually only national level, which are of little use for county level estimate. The formula used for calculating Latino immigration was the number of foreign born Latinos in each county divided by the total number of Latinos in each county.

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Another key explanatory variable represents the racial composition of the low skill job market in counties. To determine whether an industry was considered low-skilled or not, I used the Career Guide to Industries (CGI) of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006) to identify industries where more than 50% of the individuals (age 25 and over) working in that sector lacked a high-school diploma. The CGI is a survey of businesses that complies information about the nature of the industry, working conditions, job outlook, and training/education involved for various industries. The resulting low-skilled sectors are (1) agriculture, (2) forestry, (3) fishing, (4) mining, (5) construction, (6) manufacturing, (7) transportation, (8) retail trade, (9) accommodation and food serves, (10) other services, and (11) waste management. To represent a shift in the labor market in favor of Latinos, I calculated the change in the proportion of all low-skilled jobs held by Latinos, in each county, from 2000 to 2010 (*Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skilled Jobs*). The formula used to do this required dividing the number of Latinos in low-skill jobs in each county by the total number of low-skill jobs in each county. This was done for both 2000 and 2010. The 2000 number was then subtracted from the 2010 number to obtain the figure. The additional data required to make this calculation came from Summary File 4 of the 2000 Census. Values above one show a shift in favor of Latinos, while negative values reveal the opposite result.

Control Variables

To control for the number of Latinos in the counties being used, a variable was created that included the proportions of county's population that is Latino (*Pro Latino*). This helped control for the overall presence of Latinos while examining low-skill change.

This variable was calculated by dividing the Latino population in each county by the total population in each county.

Given the link between family and economic hardships, residential instability, and crime, variables representing economic hardships and residential instability were created. Independent variables included: Proportion of blacks with less than a high school diploma (*Black Less than Highschool*), proportion of black unemployed (*Black Unemployment*), proportion of black single-head households (*Black Single Headed Households)*, and proportion of blacks in poverty (*Black Poverty*). The proportion of blacks with less than a high school diploma variable was calculated by dividing the number of blacks in a county who had less than a high school diploma by the total number of blacks in a county. The black unemployment variable was calculated by dividing the number of blacks who are unemployed in a county by the total number of blacks in a county. The black single-headed household variable was calculated by dividing the number of black single headed households in a county by the total number of black households in a county. Lastly, the black poverty variable was calculated by dividing the number of blacks in poverty by the total number of blacks in a county. These four variables were converted to Z-scores, then summed to provide an overall measure of black economic disadvantage (Black Disadvantage). Additionally, white economic disadvantage was measured by number of whites with less than a high school diploma (*White Less Than Highschool*), white unemployment (*White Unemployment*), white single-headed households (*White Single Headed Household*), and whites in poverty (*White Poverty*). The same formulas were used for whites as was for blacks, except for the white population. These four variables were also converted to Z scores, then summed

to provide an overall measure of white economic disadvantage (*White Disadvantage*). Black and white median age variables were used to control for the age-crime relationship (*Black Age, White Age*).

As measures of Social Disorganization, I controlled for the proportion of residents who had moved in the past year (*Moved*), and the proportion of vacant houses in the county (*Vacant Houses*). This variable was calculated by dividing the number of residents in a county who lived in a different county a year ago by the total number of people in a county. The variable was calculated by dividing the total number of vacant houses in a county by the total number of houses in a county. Housing density was included to measure the density of the population (*Housing Density)*. This variable was calculated by dividing the number of housing units in clusters of 5 or more in a county by the total number of housing units in a county. This increases the opportunity for interpersonal violence as well as the ability to sell drugs. The total population of the country was also measured (*Total Population*). To further control for the racial/ethnic composition of the counties, the proportion of the community that was black was measured as well (*Pro Black*). This variable was calculated by dividing the number of blacks in a county by the total population in a county. Lastly, for each county, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural-Urban Continuum Code was used to create variables for metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties. This coding scheme by the USDA classifies counties into metropolitan counties based on population size, and non-metropolitan counties based on levels of urbanization and whether or not it is adjacent to a metropolitan county. Metropolitan counties represented urban counties whilst non-metropolitan counties represented rural counties (*Metro*).

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CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The descriptive statistics for the models are reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3. For descriptive purposes, both the white and black disadvantage variables were split into the four variables that composed them (*Poverty, Less Than a High School Diploma, Unemployment, and Number of Single Headed Households*). The descriptives are divided into all counties used in model in Table 1, metropolitan counties in Table 2, and non-metropolitan counties in Table 3. This serves the purposes of comparing rural and urban counties used in the model. There were no discernable differences between rural and urban counties for the mean change in proportion of Latinos in low-skill jobs variable.

There were discernable differences between rural and urban counties for other variables, however. Both instrumental and expressive crimes saw differences for both blacks and whites in rural and urban counties. For blacks, instrumental crimes saw a mean rate of 5641.23 in urban counties, but this mean dropped to 4005.14 in rural counties. The same is true for black expressive crimes, with a change of 1462.52 to 1255.17. The same is true for whites. For instrumental crimes, whites saw a mean rate of 1731.17 in urban counties, compared to 1489.89 in rural counties. For expressive crimes, whites saw a mean rate of 392.43 in urban counties, and a rate of 362.12 in rural counties

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Differences were noted between rural and urban counties in regard to blacks and whites. Rural counties saw a higher proportion of blacks in poverty, as well as blacks with no high school diploma. These two are quite possibly connected, as the same relationship exists for whites. In rural counties, there are higher proportions of impoverished whites, as well as whites without a high school diploma. The last major difference between rural and urban counties pertains to total population and population density. The mean population was much higher for urban counties; the mean housing density was also higher.

Table 1   Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for 886 U.S. Counties, 2010

	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
Black Instrumental Crimes	5236.89	3730.37	0	33470.24
Black Expressive Crimes	1414.55	1147.48	30.59	8378.14
Black Drug Manufacturing/Distribution	1077.57	1232.15	0	12267.32
Black Drug Possession	3461.92	2447.89	2.02	18495.4
White Instrumental Crimes	1671.54	1472.30	10.76	25629.67
White Expressive Crimes	385.42	458.52	2.57	5709.18
White Drug Manufacturing/Distribution	209.27	244.498	0	3321.56
White Drug Possession	1229.31	1434.42	0	24765.5
White Age	41.16	4.49	22.4	64.2
Black Age	31.99	4.76	12.7	68.4
Latino Immigration	.35	.15	.05	.80
Total Population	263,030	516,621	8332	9758256
Metro	.75	.43	0	1
Housing Density	.12	.08	.003	.95
Vacant Houses	.12	.06	.02	.54
Moved	.08	.04	.02	.46
White Single Headed Households	.08	.02	.02	.15
White No Highschool	.12	.05	.01	.30
White Poverty	.10	.04	.02	.33
White Unemployment	.07	.02	.02	.15
Black Single Headed Households	.24	.08	0	.78
Black No Highschool	.20	.09	0	.50
Black Poverty	.27	.11	.03	.78
Black Unemployment	.13	.06	0	.61
Pro Latino	.11	.12	.01	.90
Pro Black	.13	.13	.003	.79
Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skill Jobs	.04	.03	-.09	.33

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Table 2   Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for 666 Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2010

	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
Black Instrumental Crimes	5641.23	3974.07	0	33470.23
Black Expressive Crimes	1462.52	1192.57	30.59	8378.14
Black Drug Manufacturing/Distribution	1119.30	1269.86	0	12267.32
Black Drug Possession	3595.23	2477.50	2.02	18495.4
White Instrumental Crimes	1731.17	1636.63	10.76	25629.67
White Expressive Crimes	392.43	502.84	2.57	5709.181
White Drug Manufacturing/Distribution	215.98	264.46	0	3321.56
White Drug Possession	1275.37	1593.47	0	24765.5
White Age	40.72	4.49	22.4	64.2
Black Age	31.57	4.43	12.7	48.4
Latino Immigration	.35	.14	.05	.68
Total Population	332,307	578,637	11702	9758256
Metro	---	---	--	--
Housing Density	.13	.09	.01	.96
Vacant Houses	.11	.06	.02	.54
Moved	.07	.03	.02	.46
White Single Headed Households	.08	.02	.02	.15
White No Highschool	.10	.04	.01	.28
White Poverty	.10	.04	.02	.33
White Unemployment	.06	.02	.02	.15
Black Single Headed Households	.24	.07	0	.77
Black No Highschool	.18	.08	0	.46
Black Poverty	.26	.10	.03	.77
Black Unemployment	.13	.05	0	.38
Pro Latino	.11	.13	.01	.90
Pro Black	.12	.13	.003	.79
Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skill Jobs	.04	.03	-.05	.33

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Table 3   Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for 220 Nonmetropolitan
            U.S. Counties, 2010

	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
Black Instrumental Crimes	4005.14	2493.64	113.98	16583.75
Black Expressive Crimes	1255.17	968.74	58.57	7765.67
Black Drug Manufacturing/Distribution	950.47	1102.46	0	10695.19
Black Drug Possession	3060.80	2316.00	61.12	12872.78
White Instrumental Crimes	1489.89	756.65	89.82	4108.28
White Expressive Crimes	362.12	261.77	15.38	1601.50
White Drug Manufacturing/Distribution	188.84	168.68	0	1116.46
White Drug Possession	1090.73	766.58	0	4372.24
White Age	42.49	4.23	26	52.2
Black Age	33.29	5.45	19.5	47.1
Latino Immigration	.37	.16	.06	.80
Total Population	51,736	27,116	8332	189916
Metro	---	---	--	--
Housing Density	.06	.03	.004	.22
Vacant Houses	.16	.07	.06	.80
Moved	.07	.04	.02	.32
White Single Headed Households	.09	.02	.04	.13
White No Highschool	.16	.05	.05	.30
White Poverty	.13	.04	.04	.29
White Unemployment	.07	.02	.02	.13
Black Single Headed Households	.24	.10	0	.78
Black No Highschool	.27	.08	.01	.50
Black Poverty	.32	.11	.05	.78
Black Unemployment	.14	.07	0	.61
Pro Latino	.10	.11	.01	.56
Pro Black	.14	.13	.01	.62
Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skill Jobs	.03	.03	-.09	.14

The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses, expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug possession offenses for whites in the counties analyzed are presented in Table 4. Model 1 predicted instrumental offenses and showed that the change in the proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos had no significant effect on white instrumental crime rate. Similarly, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant relationship between the change in the proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and expressive crimes rates committed by whites. However, Model 3, which predicted drug manufacturing and distribution crimes, did find a significant, positive relationship (3.26) between the change in the proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing and distribution committed by whites. This means as the low-skill labor market shifted in favor of Latinos, whites experienced higher drug manufacturing and distribution arrest rates. Model 4 predicted drug possession crimes and displayed similar findings with a significant, positive relationship (3.78) occurring between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession rates of whites. This means the more the low-skill labor market shifted in favor of Latinos, whites experienced higher drug possession arrest rates. However, contrary to the original hypotheses, beta coefficients revealed that the effect of the change in the proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos was stronger for drug possession (0.15), than it was for drug manufacturing and distribution (0.10). In sum, neither instrumental nor expressive crimes were significantly affected by changes in the proportion of Latinos in the low-skill labor market. Drug manufacturing and distribution, as well as drug possession crimes were, but not in the way the original hypothesis predicted.

Further information was derived from the control variables used in this study. Total population was significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both white instrumental crime rates, as well as white expressive crime rates. Furthermore, percentage of people who have moved in the past year was also significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both white instrumental crime rates and white expressive crime rates. Vacant houses were only significantly correlated with white drug possession. This relationship was positive. White disadvantage was significant and positively correlated with both white instrumental and expressive crime rates, as well as white drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates. The proportion of a county's population who were Latino was also significantly, positively correlated with white instrumental and expressive crime rates, as well as white drug manufacturing/ distribution and drug possession crime rates.

Housing density, however, was significantly, and negatively correlated with white instrumental crime rates and white expressive crime rates. This negative relationship is also present with the proportion of a county's residents who are black. This relationship was significantly, negatively correlated with both white instrumental and expressive crimes rates, as well as white drug manufacturing/distribution and drug possession rates.

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Table 4   Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged White Crime Rates in U.S. Counties, 2010

	White Instrumental Crimes Model 1	White Expressive Crimes Model 2	White Drug Manufacturing and Distribution Model 3	White Drug Possession Model 4
Total Population#	7.06***	5.29***	1.12	3.65
	(0.96)	(0.95)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Moved	4.64**	4.22**	1.37	0.79
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Vacant Houses	-0.49	-0.63	-0.03	1.26*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.002)	(0.09)
Housing Density	-5.66***	-4.40***	0.04	-0.05
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.003)	(0.05)
White Age	0.001	-0.002	0.01	0.007
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Proportion Black	-1.71***	-0.97**	-0.95***	-0.47*
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.07)
White Disadvantage	0.098***	0.09***	0.06***	0.002
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.007)
Metro	0.15	0.03	0.14	0.10
	(0.02)	(0.004)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Change in	-2.64	-1.03	3.26**	3.78***
Proportion of	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Latinos in				
Low-Skilled				
Jobs				
Proportion Latino	2.86***	2.74***	1.43***	2.60***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.37)
Latino Immigration	0.27	0.06	0.06	-0.74***
	(0.01)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.13)
N =	871	829	880	885
R^2	.8570	.8485	.1015	.2651

***$p \leq .001$ **$p \leq .01$ *$p \leq .05$; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.

The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses, expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug possession offenses for blacks in the counties analyzed are reported in Table 5. Model 1 predicted instrumental crimes and displayed that the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos had no significant effect of black instrumental crime rate. Similarly, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant relationship between the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and expressive crimes rates committed by blacks. Model 3 predicted drug manufacturing and distribution crimes and found no significant relationship between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing and distribution committed by blacks. Model 4, however, which predicted drug possession crimes, found a significant, positive relationship (4.36) between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the drug possession rates of blacks. In sum, neither black instrumental nor black expressive crimes were significantly affected by changes in the proportion of Latinos in the low-skill labor market. Furthermore, drug manufacturing and distribution were not significantly affected. However, black drug possession crimes were significantly affected. This, however, does not support the original hypothesis.

Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both black instrumental crime rates, as well as black expressive crime rates. Vacant houses were only significantly correlated with black expressive crime rates. This relationship was positive. The proportion of a county's population who were black were significantly, positively correlated with black instrumental and black expressive crime rates. However, the

relationship was the opposite for black drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates, were it was significantly, negatively correlated. Black disadvantage was significant and positively correlated with both white instrumental and expressive crime rates.

However, percentage of people who moved in the past year was significantly, negatively correlated with black instrumental crime rates, black drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates, and black drug possession crime rates. Furthermore, the proportion of a county's population who were Latino was significantly, negatively correlated with both black instrumental and black expressive crime rates, as well as black drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates. Lastly, Latino Immigration was significantly, negatively correlated with both black expressive crime rates, as well as black drug possession rates.

Table 5   Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged Black Crime Rates in U.S. Counties, 2010

	Black Instrumental Crimes Model 1	Black Expressive Crimes Model 2	Black Drug Manufacturing and Distribution Model 3	Black Drug Possession Model 4
Total Population#	5.76***	4.09***	-1.39	-8.89
	(0.80)	(0.75)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Moved	-1.20**	-1.31	-3.96**	-4.31***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Vacant Houses	1.75	2.54*	-0.21	0.94
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.06)
Housing Density	1.43	1.21	0.52	0.66
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Black Age	0.008	0.01	-0.005	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.13)
Proportion Black	6.66***	5.48***	-2.64***	-1.63***
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.23)
Black Disadvantage	0.08**	0.09***	0.03	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Metro	0.16	0.21	0.07	0.10
	(0.02)	(0.004)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skilled Jobs	4.20	5.13	3.26	4.36***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Proportion Latino	-2.55***	-1.92**	-1.54***	-0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.01)
Latino Immigration	-0.97	-1.51**	-0.25	-0.63*
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.01)
N =	870	828	872	886
R^2	.7057	.6291	.1046	.1262

***$p \leq .001$ **$p \leq .01$ *$p \leq .05$; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.

The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses, expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug possession offenses for urban whites in the counties analyzed are presented in Table 6. Model 1, which predicted instrumental crimes, showed that the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos has no significant effect of urban white instrumental crime rate. Similarly, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant relationship between the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and expressive crimes rates committed by urban whites. However, Model 3, which predicted drug manufacturing and distribution crimes, did find a significant, positive relationship (4.19) between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing and distribution committed by whites. This means as the low-skill labor market shifts in favor of Latinos, urban whites will experience higher drug manufacturing and distribution rates. Model 4, which predicted drug possession rates, displayed similar findings with a significant, positive relationship (3.78) occurring between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession rates of urban whites. This means as the low-skill labor market shifted in favor of Latinos, urban whites experienced higher possession rates. However, contrary to the original hypotheses, beta coefficients reveal that the effect of the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos was stronger for drug possession (0.15) than it was for drug manufacturing and distribution (0.13). In sum, neither urban white instrumental nor expressive crimes were significantly affected by changes in the proportion of Latinos in the low-skill labor market. However, urban white drug manufacturing and distribution, as

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well as drug possession crimes were impacted, but not in the way the original hypothesis predicted.

Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both urban white instrumental crime rates, as well as urban white expressive crime rates. Furthermore, percentage of people who have moved in the past year was also significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both urban white instrumental crime rates and urban white expressive crime rates. Vacant houses were only significantly correlated with urban white drug possession. This relationship was positive. Urban white disadvantage was significant and positively correlated with both urban white instrumental and expressive crime rates, as well as urban white drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates. The proportion of a county's population who were Latino was also significantly, positively correlated with urban white instrumental crime rates, as well as urban white drug manufacturing/ distribution and drug possession crime rates.

Housing density, however, was significantly, and negatively correlated with urban white instrumental crime rates and urban white expressive crime rates. This negative relationship is also present with the proportion of a county's residents who are black. This relationship was significantly, negatively correlated with both urban white instrumental and expressive crimes rates, as well as urban white drug manufacturing/distribution and drug possession rates.

Table 6   Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged White Crime Rates in Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2010

	White Instrumental Crimes Model 1	White Expressive Crimes Model 2	White Drug Manufacturing and Distribution Model 3	White Drug Possession Model 4
Total Population#	7.11***	5.32***	9.78	3.53
	(0.96)	(0.95)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Moved	7.94**	6.91**	0.85	0.63
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Vacant Houses	-1.21	-1.24	-0.99	0.23*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Housing Density	-5.79***	-4.56***	-0.31	-0.86
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.08)
White Age	0.01	0.004	0.02	0.005
	(0.01)	(0.005)	(0.06)	(0.02)
Proportion Black	-2.23***	-1.28**	-0.66*	-0.37
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)
White Disadvantage	0.12***	0.11***	0.06***	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.02)
Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skilled Jobs	-4.81	-1.03	4.19*	3.78***
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Proportion Latino	3.53***	-2.32	1.47***	4.33***
	(0.10)	(-0.02)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Latino Immigration	0.46	0.16	-0.06	-0.70**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.11)
N =	656	637	664	665
R^2	.8573	.8498	.1165	.2862

***$p \leq .001$ **$p \leq .01$ *$p \leq .05$; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.

The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses, expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug possession offenses for urban blacks in the counties analyzed are presented in Table 7. Model 1, which predicted instrumental crimes, displayed that the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos has no significant effect on urban black instrumental crime rate. However, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, did show a significant, positive relationship (7.41) between the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and expressive crimes rates committed by urban blacks. This provided support for Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, Model 3, which predicts drug manufacturing and distribution crimes, did find a significant, positive relationship (6.12) between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing and distribution committed by urban blacks. This means as the low-skill labor market shifted in favor of Latinos, urban blacks experienced higher drug manufacturing and distribution arrest rates. Model 4, which predicted drug possession crimes, displayed similar findings with a significant, positive relationship (4.50) occurring between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession rates of urban blacks. This means as the low-skill labor market shifted in favor of Latinos, urban blacks experienced higher possession arrest rates. However, according to the beta coefficients and contrary to the original hypothesis, the effect of the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos was the same for drug possession (0.16), as it was for drug manufacturing and distribution (0.16). In sum, urban black instrumental crimes were not significantly affected by changes in the proportion of Latinos in the low-skill labor market. However, urban black expressive crimes were significantly affected. This,

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however, does not support my original hypothesis. Both urban black drug manufacturing and distribution crimes, as well as drug possession crimes were significantly affected. However, according to the beta coefficients, they were affected at the same degree, which does not support the original hypothesis.

Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both black instrumental crime rates, as well as black expressive crime rates. The proportion of a county's population who were black was significantly, positively correlated with black instrumental and black expressive crime rates. However, the relationship was the opposite for black drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates, were it was significantly, negatively correlated. Black disadvantage was significant and positively correlated with both black instrumental and expressive crime rates. Black age was significantly, negatively correlated with black drug possession crime rates.

However, percentage of people who moved in the past year was significantly, negatively correlated both black drug manufacturing/ distribution and black drug possession crime rates. Furthermore, the proportion of a county's population who were Latino was significantly, negatively correlated with both black instrumental and black expressive crime rates, as well as black drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates. Lastly, Latino Immigration was significantly, negatively correlated with both black expressive crime rates.

Table 7   Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged Black
            Crime Rates in Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2010

	Black Instrumental Crimes Model 1	Black Expressive Crimes Model 2	Black Drug Manufacturing and Distribution Model 3	Black Drug Possession Model 4
Total Population#	5.75***	4.08***	5.93	-5.75
	(0.79)	(0.74)	(0.003)	(0.02)
Moved	-3.63	-3.03	-3.40*	-3.27**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)
Vacant Houses	1.49	2.79	-0.74	0.32
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Housing Density	1.24	1.18	0.29	0.37
	(0.2)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Black Age	0.005	0.007	-0.004	-0.03**
	(0.006)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.13)
Proportion Black	8.34***	6.85***	-2.70***	-1.69***
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.24)
Black Disadvantage	0.11**	0.12***	0.08***	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.04)
Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skilled Jobs	5.70	7.41*	6.12**	4.50**
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Proportion Latino	-2.94**	-2.25**	-1.74***	-0.004***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.001)
Latino Immigration	-0.89	-1.78*	-0.46	-0.55
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)
N =	656	637	658	666
R^2	.7124	.6379	.1210	.1159

***$p \leq .001$ **$p \leq .01$ *$p \leq .05$; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.

The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses,

expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug

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possession offenses for rural whites in the counties analyzed in Table 8. Model 1, which predicted instrumental crimes, showed that the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos had no significant effect on the rural white instrumental crime rate. Similarly, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant relationship between the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and expressive crimes rates committed by rural whites. Furthermore, Model 3, which predicted drug manufacturing and distribution crimes, found no significant relationship between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing and distribution committed by rural whites. Lastly, Model 4, which predicted drug possession crimes, found no significant relationship occurring between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession rates of rural whites. In sum, changes in the proportion of Latinos in low-skill work does not significantly affect instrumental crimes, expressive crimes, drug manufacturing/distribution crimes, or drug possession crimes for rural whites.

Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both rural white instrumental crime rates, as well as rural white expressive crime rates. However, total population was significantly, negatively correlated with rural white drug manufacturing/distribution crimes and rural white drug possession crimes rates. Vacant houses were only significantly correlated with rural white instrumental crime rates and rural white drug possession rates. This relationship was positive. Housing density was significantly, positively correlated with rural white drug manufacturing/ distribution and rural white drug possession crime rates. Rural white disadvantage was significant and positively

correlated with both rural white instrumental and expressive crime rates, as well as rural white drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates. The proportion of a county's population who were Latino was only positively correlated with drug possession crime rates. White age was only significantly correlated with rural white expressive crime rates. The relationship was positive.

The proportion of a county's residents who are black was significantly, negatively correlated with rural white instrumental and expressive crime rates, as well as rural white drug manufacturing/ distribution crime rates. Lastly, Latino immigration was significantly, negatively correlated with white drug possession crime rates.

Table 8   Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged White Crime Rates in Non-Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2010

	White Instrumental Crimes Model 1	White Expressive Crimes Model 2	White Drug Manufacturing and Distribution Model 3	White Drug Possession Model 4
Total Population#	4.72***	4.49***	-5.91*	-5.14*
	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Moved	-0.06	0.59	1.05	-0.19
	(0.01)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Vacant Houses	0.37*	0.20	1.93	3.02***
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.25)
Housing Density	0.63	-0.35	6.39**	5.67***
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.23)	(0.02)
White Age	0.005	0.008*	0.006	0.13
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Proportion Black	-0.38***	-0.35***	-1.68**	-0.59
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.10)
White Disadvantage	0.009*	0.01**	0.08**	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.04)
Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skilled Jobs	0.22	0.51	0.73	1.83
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Proportion Latino	0.08	0.18	0.75	1.76**
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.23)
Latino Immigration	0.14	0.09	0.55	-0.77*
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.15)
N =	215	192	216	220
R^2	.5573	.4637	.1347	.2872

***$p \leq .001$ **$p \leq .01$ *$p \leq .05$; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.

The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses,

expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug

possession offenses for rural blacks in the counties analyzed in Table 9. Model 1, which predicted instrumental crimes, showed that the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos has no significant effect on the rural black instrumental crime rate. Similarly, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant relationship between the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and expressive crimes rates committed by rural blacks. Furthermore, Model 3, which predicted drug manufacturing crimes, found no significant relationship between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing and distribution committed by rural blacks. Lastly, Model 4, which predicted drug possession crimes, found no significant relationship occurring between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession rates of rural blacks. In sum, changes in the proportion of Latinos in low-skill work does not significantly affect instrumental crimes, expressive crimes, drug manufacturing/distribution crimes, or drug possession crimes for rural blacks.

Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both rural black instrumental crime rates, as well as rural black expressive crime rates. However, total population was significantly, negatively correlated with rural black drug manufacturing/distribution crimes and rural black drug possession crimes rates. Housing density was significantly, positively correlated rural black drug possession crime rates. The proportion of a county's population who were black was positively correlated with rural black instrumental and expressive crime rates. However, the relationship was the opposite for rural black drug manufacturing/distribution, as well as rural black drug possession crime

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rates. Black disadvantage was significantly, negatively correlated with black drug

manufacturing/distribution, as well as black drug possession crime rates

Table 9   Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged Black
              Crime Rates in Non-Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2010

	Black Instrumental Crimes Model 1	Black Expressive Crimes Model 2	Black Drug Manufacturing and Distribution Model 3	Black Drug Possession Model 4
Total Population#	3.60***	3.82***	-3.09	-2.58
	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Moved	-0.12	-0.17	-5.83*	-6.88***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.19)	(0.29)
Vacant Houses	-0.02	0.25	0.07	1.70
	(0.004)	(0.06)	(0.004)	(0.12)
Housing Density	0.77	-0.28	5.03	4.73*
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.18)
Black Age	0.001	0.001	0.003	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.09)
Proportion Black	1.55***	1.21***	-2.28***	-1.18*
	(0.76)	(0.63)	(0.26)	(0.17)
Black Disadvantage	0.004	0.005	-0.07*	-0.07**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(-0.20)
Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skilled Jobs	0.47	0.22	-2.86	4.08
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.14)
Proportion Latino	0.09	0.08	-1.31	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.002)
Latino Immigration	0.04	0.04	0.23	-0.79
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.14)
N =	214	191	214	220
R^2	.6135	.4729	.1652	.1949

***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤ .05; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells
with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

Prior research has established a link between community disorganization and increased crime rates. Additionally, prior research has also found that competition in the low-skill labor market associated with Latino immigration can increase the effects of disorganization. Due to the impact of the stopping circular work visas and other immigration policies, the Latino population in America increased to 50.5 million in 2012. This increase, in addition to the primarily low-skill nature of the Latino labor force, resulted in increased competition in the American low-skill labor market. Research found that this increased competition resulted in increased crime in these communities. Past research also indicates that communities, even ones thought to be disorganized, may have the ability to selectively control crimes in their confines. Therefore, this study predicted that drug manufacturing/distribution crimes and instrumental crimes, which are financially motivated, would increase in communities where this competition in the low-skill market is evident, but not drug possession and expressive crimes.

The findings from this study did not support the original hypotheses proposed, except that low-skill job competition was more strongly correlated with crime for urban blacks than urban whites. Regarding hypotheses 1, which stated that communities where

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the low-skill labor market has shifted in favor of Latinos will see a stronger increase in significance of drug distribution and manufacturing crimes than drug possession, the data did not support this for any of the models. In fact, drug possession saw a more significant increase than drug manufacturing and distribution for the full white model, the urban white model, and the full black model.

Hypothesis 2, which stated that in communities where the low-skilled labor market shifted in favor of Latinos there would be a larger increase in instrumental crimes than expressive crimes, was not supported. The results for the relationship between the proportion of low-skilled jobs held by Latinos and the rates of instrumental crimes were not significant for either the full white or full black model. This relationship was not significant for urban blacks or urban whites either. Furthermore, the relationship was not significant for either rural whites or rural blacks. The same is nearly true for the relationship between the proportion of low-skilled jobs held by Latinos and the rates of expressive crimes. The only model where significance was found between the proportion of low-skilled jobs held by Latinos and the rates of expressive crimes was the Urban black model. This provides no support for Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3, which stated that the effect of the loss of low-skill labor on crime will be positive and have a stronger effect for rural whites than rural blacks was not supported. There were differences found in the effect of the shift of the low-skill labor market on drug possession and drug manufacturing/distribution charges between urban and rural communities. The shift of the low-skill labor market correlated with a significant, positive increase in both drug manufacturing and distribution and drug possession for urban whites, but not rural whites. Likewise, this shift correlated with a significant, positive increase in expressive crimes, drug manufacturing/distribution, and

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drug possession crimes for urban blacks, but not rural blacks. This difference displays a potential stronger effect of the disorganizing abilities of low-skill job competition in urban areas for both blacks and whites. Though there was no support for hypothesis 3, the difference in the correlation between low-skill job competition and crime between rural and urban communities has clear policy implications. It suggests that job training and employment programs might be more effective for combatting crime in urban communities. However, since job competition doesn't appear to be correlated with increased crime rates in rural communities, efforts might be better focused elsewhere, such as in improving education.

However, Hypothesis 4, which stated that the effect of the loss of low-skill labor on crime will be positive and have a stronger effect for urban blacks than urban whites, was supported. Racial differences can be seen in the results as well. Though the full black and white models did not reveal any significant differences, there were significant effects in the urban models. Urban blacks saw a significant, positive increase in expressive crimes. However, urban whites did not. Additionally, though both urban whites and urban blacks saw significant, positive increase in both drug possession and drug manufacturing/distribution, the effect was stronger for urban blacks in both of these models, thus supporting hypothesis 4. These results suggest a few possibilities. Firstly, they suggest that the effects of disorganization in communities is stronger for urban blacks. Alternatively, that these communities organize themselves in different ways due to a shortage of work or social networks. However, due to the results not falling in line with the original hypotheses, other explanations need to be considered.

Additionally, in general, the R-squares for the regression models run in this study suggested that the variables used explained a large amount of the variance for expressive

and instrumental crime rates, but a low amount of the variance for drug manufacturing/ distribution and drug possession crime rates. For example, in the all-white model, the variables used in the regression explained 85.7% of the variance for instrumental crime rates and 84.9% for expressive crime rates. However, for whites, the same variables only explained 10.2% of the variance for drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates and 26.5% for drug possession rates. This trend was consistent for the other models run in the study for both blacks and whites. The variables used explained large amounts of the variance for both instrumental and expressive crimes rates, but lower amounts of drug manufacturing/ distribution crime rates.

This could possibly be due to the ways the different crimes are measured and what they represent. Both the instrumental and expressive crime rate variables in this study measure multiple types of crimes respective to that category. However, both the drug manufacturing/distribution and drug possession crime rate variables measure a specific crime. This generalness of the expressive and instrumental crime rate variables may allow for more variance to be explained due to potential common attributes shared by the crimes in each category. However, since both of the drug crime rate variables measure more specific types of crime, then those specific crimes may not share the same causes of variance as more general measures of crime. The variables that are associated with crime in general may not necessarily explain specific crimes.

The fact that whites did not see a significant increase in instrumental or expressive crimes, and that urban blacks were the only group to see an increase in expressive crimes is reminiscent of Anderson's (1999) work. Anderson (1999) proposed that deindustrialization, racism, and economic and societal deprivation resulted in a subculture developing within urban black communities. This subculture abided by a code,

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the "code of the street", which placed a higher value on violence and non-conformity in relation to general society. This code was not meant to make up ground economically, such as instrumental type crimes, but to gain a semblance of status. Anderson suggested that, since members of these communities were disregarded by general white society and had little means of gaining status by conventional means, that the code of the street was a way for these people to gain status and respect in their own terms.

Supportive evidence for this argument can be seen in how whites, both rural and urban, saw no increase in either expressive or instrumental crimes. Additionally, rural blacks saw no increase in these areas either. Urban blacks were the only group to see an increase in expressive crimes. This abides by Anderson's proposition that the code functions not to better urban blacks' economic situation, but to gain status through violence under the guide of an unconventional code of conduct.

However, the results of this study show that Anderson's argument may not be applicable outside of urban communities. Though crime increased for urban black and white communities in this study, it did not increase for rural black or white communities in the same way. Though Anderson's work provides a theoretical paradigm to understand the increase in expressive crimes in urban communities, it does not explain why this increase is not present in rural ones. Jennifer Sherman's (2009) study of poor, rural communities gives a potential explanation for this difference. In her study, she discovered that even though these rural communities were experiencing issues with poverty as a result of deindustrialization and shifting labor markets, crime was not increasing as one might expect (Sherman, 2009). Members of these communities appeared to abide by a strict moral code. Being impoverished was not necessarily looked down upon. However, how one lived in poverty was something that people in these communities judged

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(Sherman, 2009). Working for a living was viewed as the most respectable and moral way to bring in income, and welfare was considered the least moral way. However, committing crimes to make money was also considered immoral to members of these communities, even if one was poor. Rather than turn to crime, members of these communities were expected to adapt to the changing circumstances of where they lived. Examples of this included shifting to different types of jobs, cutting back on spending, growing food in gardens, or doing odd jobs for money (Sherman, 2009). This seems contrary to how Anderson depicted impoverished urban neighborhoods. Rather than forming a contradictory code of violence in response to lack of opportunities, these communities used a moral code to inform their decisions, and this moral code stressed making money by "moral" ways.

The control variables of many of the models run in this study provide potentially useful information for social disorganization theory. Disadvantage for both whites and blacks is positively associated with crime in all models except for rural black, suggesting that disadvantage is a strong predictor of higher crime rates. In every model run, the total population of counties was correlated significantly and positively with higher instrumental and expressive crime rates. However, total population was not significantly correlated with either drug manufacturing/distribution or drug possession in any of the models except for rural whites. In the rural whites model, the relationship was negative. These findings suggest that different crimes correlate with different forms of disorganization in different contexts.

This is further demonstrated by how both the white and black models had different relationships with the black population and the Latino population. In all of the white models run, proportion black was significantly and negatively associated with

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crime. Furthermore, in all of the white models, proportion Latino was significantly and positively correlated with crime. However, the opposite relationship exists in the black models. For both the all black model and the urban black models, proportion black was correlated with higher crime rates, and proportion Latino was negatively correlated with crime rates. This relationship demonstrates the potential that controlling for other variables has for social disorganization. When job competition with Latinos is controlled for, as well as other forms of disorganization, higher number of blacks ends up not being associated with higher white crime. However, the same is not true for the all black or urban black models. Higher proportion of blacks is associated with higher rates of crimes in general with the all black and urban black model, suggesting that increased number of blacks affects whites and blacks differently. The same is true for Latinos. The positive correlation between the proportion of Latinos and white crime, even when controlling for job competition with Latinos, suggests that Latinos are not competing with whites for work as much as other populations. The negative correlation in the all black and urban black models, however, imply the opposite. Since job competition is controlled for, these models suggest that Latinos are competing with blacks for work, but that it's the competition for jobs, not Latinos themselves, that are affecting black crime.

Additional examples of contextually based crime increases can be seen in how housing density decreases general crime for both the full white model and the urban white model, but increases drug crimes in the rural white model. Furthermore, housing density almost never affects the black models. The only time there is a significant correlation is in the rural black model. This trend is continued in the variable for percentage of residents who have moved in the past year. For both the all-white and urban white models, this increased general crime. However, for every black model run,

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this variable was associated with decreased drug crimes. For black drug crimes, this could be due to the network based structure of the drug trade. If people the population of a community is inconsistent, this may make keeping the networks up difficult. However, this population transition is does not help white crime. These relationships continue to demonstrate how different factors of disorganization can affect different people in different context in different ways.

These implications from the data show that low-skill job competition as a result of Latino immigration doesn't just disorganize communities evenly. For both the full models and urban models for both blacks and whites, both drug possession and drug manufacturing/distribution significantly increased. However, this effect is felt much more strongly for urban communities than it is for rural ones. This adds to previous work (e.g. Shihedah & Ousey, 1998; Shihedah & Barranco, 2010a; Shihedah & Barranco, 2010b) by showing that the effects of low-skill job competition extend beyond just homicide and violent crime. However, at the same time, the results suggest that perhaps communities are not as affected in the same ways. The effects of disorganization and labor market changes are place, context, and people oriented. Though urban communities saw increases of crime in relation to increased job competition, rural ones did not see the same results. Furthermore, urban whites did not see as strong of a correlation between job competition and crime and urban blacks did. This displays the importance of place, and how different places affect different kinds of people. Though the competition for low-skill work creates incentive for financially motivated crimes, these types of crimes did not increase at a significantly higher rate than expressive crimes. This may suggest that competition for low-skill work does not create financially motivated offenders, but instead creates offenders motivated by decreased status, as suggested by Anderson

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(1999). However, the effects of different forms of disorganization seem to be context based.

Contributions

This study contributes to the literature pertaining to social disorganization theory by displaying how specific crimes and circumstances intersect in different communities. Though expressive and instrumental crimes appear to not be affected by competition in the low-skill labor market for white communities, the results seem to be different for black communities. Furthermore, the effect is not felt the same amongst all black communities. Expressive crimes only significantly increase in urban black communities, but not for rural black communities. However, drug possession crimes and drug manufacturing/distribution crimes significantly increased in both the full white and black models, as well as the urban white and black models, but not in the rural models. These differences demonstrate the importance of place and context. Neither black nor white rural communities saw positive correlations between Latino low-skill job competition and crime. The different reactions to disorganization by rural and urban communities strengthen the argument that place and context matter. Rural and urban communities appear to be reacting differently to different forms of disorganization, and may in fact be organizing themselves differently. Lastly, the patterns that the R-squared measures take throughout all the models further demonstrates how variables that explain high amounts of variance for general crime may not necessarily explain much of the variance in more specific measures of crime.

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Limitations

This study is hindered by certain limitations. The use of macro-level data prevents this study from being able to understand individual motivation for why crimes are committed. We can only make assumptions about why particular crimes were committed based on of this type of data. Perceptions and individual motivations are beyond the scope of this study. Being able to understand these perceptions and motivations would allow researchers to better understand which criminological framework better explains the reasons that these crimes are being committed. Furthermore, the lack of information and data on undocumented immigrants does limit the ability of this study to fully account for the full effect of Latino immigration and its effect on the low-skill job market and crime. The findings of this study are a conservative estimate of the impact Latinos have on certain crimes through their competitive impact on the low-skill labor market. Additionally, as with all studies that use official data, there are limitations regarding what conclusions can be drawn. Unreported crimes are not included in UCR databases. Therefore, a full picture of expressive, instrumental, drug possession, and drug manufacturing/distribution crimes cannot be made. Not all counties have the same reporting procedures, and therefore consistency cannot be assumed for the data.

Future Research

Future research into this area of criminological study should consider why these differences in community levels crimes occur. What really influences why urban black communities are the only ones who increase significantly in expressive crimes in response to low-skill job competition? Future studies could also use multilevel analyses, using both individual-level data and macro-level data to understand community trends.

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Furthermore, a consistent measure for undocumented immigration would assist in better accounting for the actual effect of Latino immigration. Further research could also study the effects of low-skill job competition on different, more specified crimes. This would allow for a better understanding of how specific types of crime are affected by this event. Lastly, though the original hypotheses mostly did not work, the results did suggest that not all crimes are affected by disorganization. Future research should examine why disorganization only affects certain crimes and not others, as well as what conditions lead to only these particular crimes increasing.

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